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Abstract 
A burgeoning literature on how the benefits from research may be negative in the 
presence of price supports depends on at least two critical factors. ~,in comparing the social 
benefits of research with and without commodity policy, these studies (implicitly) assume that 
the level of the commodity policy instrument is held constant. This necessarily implies that the 
net transfer to farmers increases. We show that the reverse (commodity policy changes and net 
transfers constant) will generate very different results, namely, that the deadweight costs of price 
supports almost always declines with research expenditures. Second, these studies fail to specify 
the underlying objective function or decision-mechanism of the government in assessing the 
efficacy of research expenditures in the presence of commodity policy. We specify three 
alternative objective functions, each having commodity policy endogenous (Le., adjusting after 
an exogenous change in the level of cost reducing public research expenditures). We determine 
that the social benefits from research in the presence of endogenous commodity policy are higher 
than that determined by studies in the literature that assume an exogenous commodity policy. 
This has important policy implications. 
-
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1. Introduction 
Several papers emphasize the importance of analyzing the welfare economics of public 
good and commodity policies jointly (see Lichtenberg and Zilberman, and Alston, Edwards and 
Freebairn for earlier works, and Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz for a more recent contribution). The 
latter two studies compare the social benefits from cost-reducing public research expenditures 
under alternative commodity policies with the benefits of research under no commodity policy. 
Although no general conclusion can be drawn, Alston, Edwards and Freebairn determine thatfew, 
if any commodity policies (that favor farmers) result in an increase in the social benefits from 
research. This explains the emphasis by Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz, who go one step further 
than Alston, Edwards and Freebairn, that the social benefits from research expenditures may be 
negative in the presence of a commodity policy. 
In this paper, we show that the results of studies like that of Alston, Edwards and Freebairn 
and of Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz depend on at least two critical factors. E.irs1, in comparing the 
social benefits of research with and without commodity policy, these studies (implicitly) assume 
that the level of the commodity policy instrument is held constant. This necessarily implies that 
the net transfer to farmers increases. We show that the reverse (commodity policy changes and 
net transfers constant) will generate very different results, namely, that the deadweight costs of 
price supports almost always declines with research expenditures. We conclude that both 
approaches are equally arbitrary. 
Second, these studies fail to specify the underlying objective function or decision­
mechamsm of the government in assessing the efficacy of research expenditures in the presence of 
commodity policy. Anania and McCalla show that a social welfare maximizing government will 
have no commodity policy unless there are favorable international terms of trade effects. A ­
framework of analysis is needed that has a government objective function which predicts the 
existence of alternative commodity policies in the first place. To this end, we specify three 
alternative objective functions, each having commodity policy endogenous (i.e., adjusting after an 
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exogenous change in the level of cost reducing public research expenditures). We determine that 
the social benefits from research in the presence of endogenous commodity policy are higher than 
that determined by studies in the literature that assume an exogenous commodity policy. This has 
important policy implications. 
Our analysis maintains the assumptions of the cited literature that research is exogenous 
and induces a shift in the supply curve. In addition to the effect on national welfare, we determine 
the distributional effects (while ignoring the effects on other countries). As in these other studies, 
we also assume that the choice of the policy instrument is exogenous, Le., that the specific 
commodity policy under consideration is assumed to be the only available instrument to 
redistribute income. We analyze the impact of research on deadweight costs for several stylized 
policy-trade combinations and government decision-making formulations. The policy-trade 
combinations include a production quota for a non-traded good, a target price with deficiency 
payment for a non-traded good, an import tariff for a small country, and a fixed price support with 
export subsidies for a large country. 
The distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we have an endogenous ~ of the 
commodity policy, using alternative government objective functions with each predicting 
commodity policy in all cases. The equilibrium commodity policy, however, adjusts following the 
introduction of the cost-reducing research, thereby augmenting the aggregate effect of commodity 
policy on the benefits from research. The extent of adjustment in commodity policy depends on 
both the specific policy instrument under consideration and the assumed objective function of the 
government. 
This paper is organized as follows. The following section outlines a general model. In 
section 3, we compare the social benefits of research under the assumption (eg, Alston, Edwards 
and Freebairn) of a fixed policy instrument level (for several commodity policies) with those 
-
under an equally arbitrary assumption of a fixed net transfer level. In every case, the Alston, 
Edwards and Freebairn methodology yields smaller social benefits from research in the presence 
of commodity policy. 
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In section 4, we analyze two stylized commodity policies under three alternative 
government objective functions: (a) maximize income subject to a farm income constraint; 
(b) maximize a weighted preference function; and (c) maximize political support. The social 
benefits from research in the presence of a commodity policy are found to be mostly higher than 
that of the literature which assumes commodity policy instrument levels to be fixed. The final 
section provides some concluding remarks as to the policy implications vis-a-vis the received 
wisdom of the literature analyzing the welfare economics of research and commodity policy. 
A General Model 
Define e1 as the net income of individual i prior to the introduction of research and 
commodity policy. Consider now the introduction of a commodity policy that redistributes 
income between sectors. Define t1(t) as the net aggregate income transfer for i resulting from the 
commodity policy. Define yA as the income of agricultural producers, which can be decomposed 
into income from market activities (eA) and income transfers from the commodity policy (tA): 
[1] yA = eA + tA 
Define yB as the income of consumers and taxpayers: 1 
[2] yB = eB + tB 
Typical commodity policies like price supports, import tariffs, export subsidies and production 
quotas induce deadweight costs. Define ti(O) = 0, tACt) = t and tB(t) = - t - c(t), where c(t) 
represents the deadweight costs. Therefore, t > 0 describes the aggregate net income transfer to 
farmers, with agriculture subsidized by consumers and/or taxpayers. 
How are the benefits from research affected under these market distortions induced by 
commodity policy? The total effect of research on national income is given by: 
-

[3] dY/d't = deA/d't + deB/d't - dc/d't - 1 
For simplicity, we combine consumers and taxpayers into one group. I 
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Equation [3] indicates that the impact of research on total income is the sum of the change in 
market incomes (de1/d't) from both producers and consumers (through improved productivity and 
lower costs/prices), minus the change in total deadweight costs (dc/d't) and the costs of financing 
the investment (reflected in the last term, which ignores the excess burden of taxation). 
The social optimal research expenditure level 'tm maximizes total national income Y in the 
absence of commodity policy and is determined by: 
A comparison of conditions [3] and [4] indicates that dc/d't is critical in determining how much 
total income will diverge from maximum income due to commodity policy. Alston, Edwards and 
Freebaim's analysis, for example, indicates that the net impact of research on deadweight costs is 
indeterminant, depending on the specific policy and the significance/status of the sector in world 
markets. However, the latter study indicates that in most cases cost-reducing research increases 
deadweight costs of commodity policy distortions (dc/d't > 0), which lowers the aggregate social 
benefits from research.2 
Taking Alston, Edwards and Freebaim as an example, the literature compares the benefits 
from cost-reducing research in the presence of different commodity policies with the benefits from 
research under free-market conditions. In our notation, this is the difference between 
flY/fl't at a given commodity policy level and flY/fl't without commodity policy. Let x represent 
the level of a given commodity policy instrument. Then the standard basis of comparison can be 
written as flY(x)/fl't - flY(O)/fl't, and is given by: 
I 
[5]	 - flY(x)/fl't - flY(O)/fl't 
= [fleA(x)/fl't + fleB(x)/fl't - flc(x)/fl't - 1] - [fleA(O)/fl't + fleB(O)/fl't - flc(O)/fl't - 1] 
= - flc(x)/fl't 
­
2 In their table I, Alston, Edwards and Freebairn summarize 13 policy/trade status combinations, of which 7 yield a 
negative impact, 3 a zero impact, I a positive impact and two depending on other factors. 
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At the margin, it holds in general that dY(x)/d't - dY(O)/d't = - dc(x)/d't. 3 
We can disaggregate the total impact of public research 't on deadweight costs of the 
commodity policy (dc/d't): 
[6] dc/d't = 8c/ftr + (8c/at) (at*/ftr) 
where the first term, 8c/ftr, represents the impact of 't on c for a given level of the net income 
transfer t. The second term 8c/at reflects the change in deadweight costs if there is a change in 
the net income transfer 1. The optimal transfer t* can be solved from a specific government 
objective function, which also determines the magnitude of the final term at*/ftr, reflecting the 
extent to which the optimal transfer t* changes with public research. 
For example, Alston, Edwards and Freebaim's analysis assumes that the level of the 
commodity policy x is held constant as public research investments increase. Therefore, they 
(implicitly) assume that the government increases the transfer to agriculture at the same time when 
they invest (more) in research, i.e. at*/ftr > 0 in their analysis. 4 As such, t* is implicitly 
endogenous in their model, because t* adjusts with an increase in't. 
To illustrate the importance of any underlying assumption, let us consider the (equally 
arbitrary) assumption that the net transfer to farmers is held constant (i.e. at*/ftr = 0) for four 
stylized commodity policies. 
Output quota (closed economy) 
Figure 1 depicts the case of an output quota in a closed economy, where D and S(O) 
represent the demand and supply curves, respectively. Denote Qa as the initial output quota, , 
generating a new price Pa. The net income transfer t* is area ABDE - DFG. Research shifts the 
supply curve to S('t), causing deadweight costs to increase from area BFG to area BIH. This 
-

3 This result is also shown in Alston and Martin, and Anania and McCalla. Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz push the 
argument further and claim that research investments may increase deadweight costs of commodity policy to the 
extent that "gross annual research benefits (GARB)" are negative. In our notation,.Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz show 
that lieA(x)/Ii't + lieB(x)/Ii't < lic(x)/Ii't for a typical commodity policy. 
4 The same applies to Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz. 
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confirms the conclusion by Alston, Edwards and Freebairn that deadweight costs increase with 
research (dc/d't > 0) for a given level of the commodity policy instrument. 
Now consider the case where the net transfer t* is held constant. The government needs to 
increase the output quota to Qb. The resulting price is Pb and t* equals area RLNJ - NIM = 
ABDE - DFG (by construction). It follows that dc/d't < O. To show this, consider the case where 
Pb - Pt = Pa - Po' which would imply that dc/d't = O. In this case NIM = DFG (with linear supply 
and demand curves), while RLNJ > ABDE. This would imply that fJt*/fJt > 0, which is 
inconsistent with our initial assumption. Therefore, it must be that Pb - Pt < Pa - Po which implies 
that LIM < BFG, and so dc/d't < O. 
Target price and deficiency payments (closed economy) 
Figure 2 depicts a target price Toto producers and a market clearing price Po paid by 
consumers. The net transfer to farmers is area HIBA and the increase in consumer surplus is area 
ABJK. Taxpayer expenditures are area HIJK and social costs are area BU. Now consider the 
effects of public research expenditures that shifts the supply curve to S('t). With a fixed target 
price, deadweight costs increase to CLM and market prices fall to Pl' However, if the transfer t* 
is to be held at the initial level (= HIBA), then the target price is reduced to T1 and consumer 
prices rise to P2' Social costs decrease from BU to CRT, with t* = URCV = HIBA. 
Import tariff (small country) 
Figure 3 shows the impact of research with an import tariff for a small country. Farmers 
receive To above the world market price Po, sustained by an import tariff To - Po. Domestic 
consumption is Qd(O) and supply is at QS(O). The net transfer to farmers induced by the import 
tariff is area ABED with deadweight costs associated of areas BIE and NKM. 
The public research investment would induce an increase in the transfer t if the import tariff is 
maintained at To - Po. But in order to keep the transfer t constant, the import tariff has to decline to -
Tl - Po. Domestic prices fall from To to Tl. Consumption and production both increase, to Qd('t) 
and QS('t), respectively. Deadweight costs c('t) equal the sum of areas FJH and RLM. It is evident 
from Figure 3 that c('t) < c(O): hence ~c/~'t < O. In the appendix, we show formally that 8c/fJt> 0, 
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Be/at < 0, c?c/a.2 > 0, and that c?c/atOt <,=,> for t > = < 0 in this case of an import tariff for a 
small country. 
Export subsidy with afixed support price (large economy) 
The free market equilibrium before and after the introduction of public research expenditures 
for a large country exporter is depicted in Figure 4a. The shift in domestic supply also shifts the 
excess supply curve along the excess demand curve ED facing the exporter, resulting in a new 
world price equilibrium Pt. Exports increase to X('t) and consumer surplus increases to ABCD. 
The change in producers surplus is area IHFG minus area AEID. Whether consumers or producers 
benefit more from research investment 't in the absence of market intervention depends on trade 
levels and on the supply and demand elasticities.5 
Consider a fixed support price To with a (variable) export subsidy To - PI in Figure 4b. 
Production increases from Q(O) to Q(t) and exports increase from X(O) to X(t). The world market 
price falls to Pl' Per unit export subsidies equal To - Pl' Total taxpayer expenditures equal area 
JKLM = RSTV. The net transfer to agrtculture is the area ASEZ and the change in consumer 
surplus is - ARBZ. 
Deadweight costs c now includes domestic consumption and production distortions (areas 
RXB and SEW, respectively, with RXB + SEW = KNO) and subsidies to foreign consumers, 
(equal to area YOLM = XWTV). 
With To fixed, deadweight costs increase with research investment 'to However, when tis 
held constant, To needs to decline. The impact on deadweight costs is less than what it was when 
To was held constant. Whether deadweight costs increase or decrease depends on several factors, 
most importantly on the elasticity of domestic and foreign demand, and of domestic supply. 
-

5 Using the same notation as in the mathematical derivations of the appendix, it follows that without commodity 
policy, producer surplus PS = (pw -t::?/2a and consumer surplus CS = (px - pW)2/2rc. Therefore, dPS/dt = 0 
QS[(l/rc)+(l/y)]/n and dCS/dt = oQ Ian. This implies that producers gain less than consumers from an increase in 
public research; i.e. dPS/dt < dCS/dt iff QdlQs > a[(l/rc) + (l/y)]. This is more likely to occur when the self­
sufficiency ratio is greater, when domestic and foreign demand are less elastic (i.e. smaller rc and y) and when 
supply is more elastic (larger a). These conditions are characteristic of agriculture in industrial countries. 
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Appendix I shows that Bc/EJt can only be positive if the export subsidy is small, foreign and 
domestic demand are inelastic, and if supply is elastic. 
Table 1 summarizes the four examples described above. In all cases, dc/d't is less when the 
transfer is held constant (EJt*/EJt = 0) compared to when the commodity policy instrument level is 
fixed. Moreover, with the exception of a variable export subsidy scheme in limited circumstances, 
all cases have deadweight costs declining with research (Le. Bc/EJt < 0), which implies that dc/d't < 
ofor EJt*/EJt = O. This also implies that total income increases with research (Le., dY/d't > 0 for 0 < 
't ::; 'tm ).6 
Clearly, the impact of research on deadweight costs depends critically on the assumptions 
regarding the determination of the observed (optimal) level of the net farm income transfer t*, and 
hence of the commodity policy instrument level x. The analysis above compares two arbitrary 
rules for determining EJt*/EJt: fix either the net farm income transfer or the level of the commodity 
policy instrument. It is more appropriate to specify a particular policy objective function to 
determine precisely what aspect of redistributive policy is endogenous in order to appropriately 
evaluate the implications of commodity policy on social benefits to research. We do so in the 
following section for three alternative decision-mechanisms. 
4. Endogenous Commodity Policy under Three Government Decision Models 
Maximize Income Subject to a Farm Income Constraint 
A government maximizing aggregate social income subject to a farm income constraint is 
depicted by the following decision problem: 
[6] _MaxY=yA+yB 
S.t. yA ~ yO 
Assume eA < yO such that t* is positive. It follows that yA(t*) = yO, with t* = yO - eA. What 
-

determines the magnitude of EJt*/EJt (and consequently dc/d't) under this model formulation? It 
will depend on how research affects endowment incomes for prodticers and consumers (eA and 
6 This means the "no-gains-from-research-point" in Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz does not exist. 
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eB) with no commodity policy. Research reduces consumer prices (unless it is a small country) so 
yB('t) ~ yB(o). It follows that at*/&r. < for aeA/&r. > 0 (and vice versa). More specifically, at*/&r.
. 
= - aeA/&r.. If research increases eA to the extent that eA('t) > yO, then t* will become zero. The 
critical factor in this model is the impact of't on eA, which depends on the structure of the sector 
(de Gorter and Zilberman) and the commodity policy instrument. 
Consider first the case of a small country importer with an import tariff (Figure 3). 
Producer surplus increases with research (BeA/&r. > 0). Hence at*/&r. < O. Tariffs fall to Tz - po. 
As a consequence, deadweight costs fall to areas HUV + WYM < BIE + NMK. Although the new 
tariff depicted in Figure 3 is still positive, it need not be so. It depends on the productivity of 
research, the initial size of the tariff, the trade situation and the supply/demand elasticities. 
In the case of a closed economy, equilibrium prices will decline with an increase in 
research. Consider the case of a target price with deficiency payments. Without the target price, 
the gross gain to consumers is area ABCV and for producers, area FECG minus area ABEV (see 
Figure 2). It follows that 8.eB/8.'t = ABCV and that 8.eA/8.'t = (FECG - ABEV). The relative size 
of the gross benefits depends on the demand and supply elasticities. In the appendix, we formally 
derive that with demand more elastic than supply (1t < a), benefits for consumers will be smaller 
than for producers (deA/d't > deB/d't <=> a> P), and vice versa. 
Can at*/&r. be positive in this scenario? Price reductions will be larger with a more 
inelastic demand and a more elastic supply. This will have a more adverse effect on producer 
surplus. Figure 5 shows how, with perfectly inelastic demand (Dl), the induced equilibrium price 
change equals the vertical shift of the supply curve (i.e. the reduction in marginal costs induced by 
research). Producer income eA changes from area ABD to area EFG with research. By 
construction, ABD = EFG and therefore deA/d't = O. With demand less than perfectly inelastic 
(D2), eA shifts from ABD to HIG. As HIG = HIFE + EGF < EGF = ABD, it follows that deA/d't 
-

>0. 
Therefore, we can conclude that under this decision model that at*/&r. ~ 0 always (with at*/ 
&r. < 0 unless demand is perfectly inelastic). As a consequence dc/d't < Bc/&r., and the aggregate 
10
 
impact of research on deadweight costs is even more negative under this decision-model than 
when 8t*/fJt =0 in our earlier analysis. 
Government Maximizing a Weighted Income Preference Function 
A government maximizing a weighted income preference function is given by: 
[7] Max eyA + yB 
where e :2: 0 is the relative weight farm incomes have in the government's objective function. The 
optimal transfer for this government is determined by 
[8] dc(t*)/dt = e - 1 
which implies that t* > 0 for e > 1: commodity policy favors farmers if they have a higher weight 
than consumers. 
How will 't affect the optimal transfer t* under this decision problem? Applying the 
implicit function theorem to [8], one can derive: 
[9] 8t*/fJt = - (ff2c/8tfJt)/(ff2c/8t2). 
Condition [9] indicates that t* will increase if research induces marginal deadweight costs to 
decrease for a given transfer, provided that the deadweight cost function is convex (Le. ff2c/8t2 > 
0). The change in optimal transfer only depends on the deadweight cost function. If research 
makes it less (more) expensive at the margin to redistribute income, the government will increase 
(reduce) the transfer. The effect of't on marginal deadweight costs will, again, depend on the 
particular commodity policy instrument. 
In the appendix, we show that ff2c/8tfJt < 0 and ff2c/8t2 > 0 for an import tariff (t > 0) in a 
small country. Using condition [9], this implies that the optimal transfer t* increases with research 
­
expenditures 't (8t*/fJt > 0). Therefore, dc/d't > &JfJt, with fJc/fJt < 0 as shown before. Can the ,­
increase in deadweight costs induced by the optimal transfer t* -be more than offset by the 
reduction in the deadweight costs per unit of transfer, i.e. can (Bc/8t)(8t*/fJt) + Bc/fJt > 0 despite 
fJc/fJt < O? 
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In the appendix, we derive the following condition: Bc/Ot = (l+(a/7t)) (pt - pW)/(pt _pm), 
where a and 7t are the slopes of the linear supply and demand functions, pW is the world market 
price, pt the domestic price and pm the intercept of the supply function with the vertical axis. 
Condition [8] for the case of a tariff in a small country becomes: 
[10] (pL pW)/(pL pm) = (8 - 1)(l+(a/7t)) 
Given our assumptions, all parameters on the right hand side of condition [10] are unaffected by 'to 
Hence, for pt > pW > pm, it must be that 0 < (8 - 1) (l +a;f3)) < 1, which in turn implies that 
apt/apm < O. As't induces a decline in pm, this means that pt will increase, inducing an increase 
in deadweight costs c(t): dc/dt> O. 
Notice that, for a similar reason, Bc/8't < 0 and Ot*/8't > 0 because there is a reduction in 
total (Bc/8't) or marginal (a2c/Ot8't) deadweight costs per unit of transfer. In this case, the term 
Ot*/8't> 0 more than offsets the term ac/8't < O. 
In case of a target price with deficiency payments in a closed economy, B2c/Ot8't < 0 and 
the sign of B2c/Ot2 is conditional on the elasticity of demand and supply. With demand more 
elastic than supply (a > ~), the deadweight cost function is convex (a2c/Ot2 > 0) (and vice versa if 
supply is more elastic than demand). This implies that the transfer t* will decline when supply is 
more elastic than demand. In this case, the total effect of't on deadweight costs is unconditionally 
negative: dc/d't < 0 for a < ~, with ac/8't < 0, ac/Ot > 0, and Ot*/8't < O. When supply is less 
elastic than demand and the deadweight cost function is concave, Ot*/8't is positive. The impact 
on dc/d't is then conditional on other factors. 
Maximizing Political Support 
Now consider the case when the government maximizes political support (de Gorter and 
Tsur). Following Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) and Swinnen (1994), assume that the government 
solves the following specific problem: 
-
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subject to the government budget constraint, where SI is political support provided by the agents in 
the economy, which has the following form: 
. . 
The functions SI(.), Ul(.), and therefore V1(.), are continuous, at least twice continuously 
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Assume that both sectors pay equal shares 
of the research expenditures, and that there are no distortions caused by the taxes in financing 
these investments. Hence: 
. . . 
[13] yl = e1 + tL 't/2 
The first order condition for the politically optimal level of the net farm income transfer t* for a 
given level of the public investment, financed by tax 'to, is given by: 
-
. . 
where SIV and Uly are first order derivatives with respect to their respective arguments. The size 
and sign oft* depends on (a) the deadweight costs associated with the commodity policy, (b) the 
relative pre-policy endowment incomes between agriculture and industry, and (c) the distributional 
impact of the public investment (Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995). 
How is the optimal transfer t* affected by research when the government maximizes 
political support? From [14], we can derive: 
at*[15] - ­
a't wA +wB (1 +C t )2 + ZBcn 
where wi = Svvi(Uyi)2 + Svi Uyyi and zi = Svi Uyi. Concavity of Si and Ui imply that wi < 0 
and zl > O. 
In this case of government maximizing political support, the effects on marginal 
deadweight costs are still operative, as discussed in the previous decision formulations, but there 
will be an additional and more important consideration. This can be seen by comparing equations 
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[9] and [15]. The last terms in both the numerator and denominator of [15] correspond to the 
numerator and denominator of [9]. However these terms are now only partial effects, weighted by 
the Zl and WI terms. The other terms in [15] reflect the "political interaction effects (PIEs)" 
(Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995). This means that research investment -r will affect the marginal 
political support levels for a given transfer level t, and as a consequence, -r will affect the 
politically optimal t*. 
Let us discuss condition [15] in detail, for the case of a small country import tariff. First, 
Ctt > 0, which implies that the denominator is always negative. The sign of the numerator depends 
on yA-r and yB-r. First, define -ri as the optimal research level for sector i, which is determined as 
y\(-r l ) = O. A support maximising government will never implement an investment level outside 
the interval [-rA,-rB], because both sectors will support shifting the investment level inside this 
interval. Furthermore, for every -r within this interval, it must be that yA-r and yB-r have opposite 
signs (unless one is zero). 
A BRecall that yA-r = e -r - (1/2) and yB-r = e -r - (1/2) - C-r. In the case of a small country 
import tariff, eA-r > 0, eB-r = 0 and aclm < O. This implies that all the research benefits in the 
absence of commodity policy go to farmers. Consider what would happen with t*. In the absence 
of market distortions, C-r = 0, Ct-r = 0, yA-r > 0 and yB-r < 0 which would imply that the first and 
second term in condition [15]'s denominator are negative and the third term zero, and thus that 
fJt*lm < O. In general, it is politically optimal for the government to compensate the sector which 
benefits relatively less from the investment by raising the transfer to this sector. In this case, 
B
agriculture benefits more from the investment (eA-r > e -r = 0) and so the transfer t* decreases. 
The political interaction effect induces a decline in the transfer t* (and thus of the commodity 
policy instrument level). 
This result is mitigated because (a) deadweight costs per unit of transfer decline with-r 
-
(c-r < 0) and (b) marginal deadweight costs per unit of transfer decrease (ct-r < 0). It cannot be 
ruled out that these "economic interaction effect (EIEs)" can under certain circumstances more 
than offset the "political interaction effects (PIE)". The latter (Ct-r < 0) makes the last term of the 
numeration of [12] positive. The former (c-r < 0) increases yB-r: consumers benefit because the 
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deadweight costs on the existing transfer declines: yB't = - C't - (1/2). With yA't = eA't - (1/2), 
A B . th Ay 't > Y 't requIres at e 't > - c't.7 
Simulations indicate that, while the (secondary) EIEs mitigate the (primary) PIEs, they do 
not offset them, except under extreme assumptions on the parameters (Swinnen and de Gorter, 
1995). Therefore, the simulations suggest that, in general, a*/ETt < 0 will result in this case, 
implying that dc/d't < O. In summary, we emphasize that the same factor which reduces the impact 
of't on deadweight costs c (Bc/ETt < 0), causes c to increase, because it induces an increase in the 
equilibrium transfer (or reduces it less).8 
In the case of a target price and deficiency payment, the effects also depend on the relative 
elasticity of supply and demand. When demand is inelastic and supply elastic (a > P) agriculture 
benefits more from research than consumers in the absence of market intervention. (eA't > eB't). 
This tends to increase the optimal transfer. This effect is mitigated by the negative effect of't on 
total and marginal deadweight costs: C't < 0 and Ct't < O. If eA't > eB't - C't, then the first and 
second term of the numeration of [15] will be negative. With Ct't < 0, the last term will be 
positive. If the eA't > eB't effect is stronger, then a*/ETt < 0 for a > p. Combining this with Bc/ETt 
< 0 yields that dc/d't < 0 under these conditions. When a < p, all three terms of the numerator of 
[15] are positive. However now the third term of the denominator is positive (while the other two 
are negative) as Ctt < 0 for a < p. If the first two terms are stronger, a*/ETt > 0 and the net effect 
on dc/d't is conditional, again. 
Summary and Discussion 
As summarized in Table 2, in only one case does research unconditionally increase 
deadweight costs of commodity policy (small country import tariff with government maximizing a 
7 Ifresearch has ~ insi~ficant effect on producer surplus (eA't) but a large ~pact on deadweight costs (c't), then it 
is possible that ~ 't < y t S~ecifically, one can show (see appendix) that e 't ~ C't <=> 1 + s - (1+ (a/p))s2 ~ 
owhere s = (p - pw) / (p - pm). This is more likely if supply is elastic (a small), if demand is inelastic (P large) -

and if the tariff level is high (s large). For example with s = I (100%), eA't ~ c't if supply is more elastic than 
demand (a ::; P). With s = 0.5 and 0.1, this requirement reduces to a ::; 5P) and a ::; 109P, respectively. 
8 This offsetting effect holds in general. In case of very distortionary policies for which Bc/ETt > 0, the EIE impact 
on m*/ETt would be negative, inducing a decrease in equilibrium transfers, which would tend to offset the "direct" 
positive effect of Bc/ETt > o. 
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weighted preference function). In three cases, the impact is unconditionally negative: deadweight 
costs decrease with research. In two more cases, deadweight costs will decrease if PIEs outweigh 
EIEs in determining 81:*/81:. 9 
In Table 1, the only policy/trade combination that could have of research increasing 
deadweight costs for a given transfer (Bc/fJt > 0) was export subsidies in a large country with a 
fixed price support. Apart from the fact that no export subsidy program operates this way (loan 
rates and intervention prices vary in the United States and the European Union, respectively), it is 
still not likely that deadweight costs increase with fixed support prices. In the appendix, we show 
that Bc/fJt > 0 may result when the export subsidy is small, when foreign and domestic demand are 
inelastic, and when domestic supply is elastic. But we also show that under these (elasticity) 
conditions, agriculture is likely to benefit most from research (see the appendix for a formal 
derivation). Therefore, research will induce a government (maximizing either social welfare or 
political support) to reduce the optimal transfer t* to agriculture. This has the opposite effect on 
deadweight costs and so may offset the Bc/fJt factor. 
Concluding Remarks 
There is a burgeoning literature analyzing the welfare economics of public research and 
commodity policies jointly (for example, see Alston and Martin; Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz). 
Social benefits from research under alternative commodity policies are compared with the benefits 
of research under no commodity policy. The consensus is that commodity policies result in a 
decrease in the social benefits of research, and indeed the latter may go negative. The policy 
implications are very grave and are best summarized by Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz (p. 162): 
"Why continue investing in agricultural research ... if the major impact is ... additional 
export subsidies? Are the results from past studies showing impressive returns to research 
still valid?" 
-
We show in this paper that these results depend on the critical assumption that the level of the 
commodity policy instrument is held constant (necessarily requiring an increase in the net transfer 
9 This was the case in all simulations in Swinnen and de Gorter (1995). Notice further that this is a sufficient but not 
a necessary condition, because dc/d't<O might still result with fJt*/fJt > 0 as long as the 8c/fJt « 0) effect is stronger. 
16
 
to farmers). We show that the reverse (commodity policy changes and net transfers constant) will 
generate very different results, namely, that the deadweight costs of price supports almost always 
decline with research expenditures. Indeed, in every case, the Alston, Edwards and Freebairn 
methodology yields smaller social benefits from research in the presence of commodity policy. 
We conclude that both approaches are equally arbitrary and to overcome this, one needs to 
specify the underlying objective function or decision-mechanism of the government in assessing 
the efficacy of research in the presence of commodity policy. We detennine that the social 
benefits from research in the presence of endogenous commodity policy are higher than that 
detennined by studies in the literature that assume an exogenous commodity policy. This has 
important policy implications in that governments should be encouraged to continue productive 
research investments in the presence of commodity policy. 
The distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we have an endogenous commodity 
policy, using alternative government objective functions with each predicting commodity policy in 
all cases. The equilibrium commodity policy, however, adjusts following the introduction of the 
cost-reducing research, thereby augmenting the aggregate effect of commodity policy on the 
benefits from research. We show that the extent of adjustment in commodity policy depends on 
both the specific policy instrument under consideration and the assumed objective function of the 
government. 
Further research should have both research and commodity policy endogenous (de Gorter, 
Nielson and Rausser). Nevertheless, our analysis shows the importance of departing from the 
stringent assumptions of the literature whereby the level of the commodity policy is exogenous 
and the net income transfer to farmers changes with research. 
-
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Appendix 
In this appendix, we analyze the impact of public research expenditures on deadweight costs 
for three commodity policies. We use a partial equilibrium model with linear functions, as 
presented in the figures and discussed in the text above. 
A.I Target price with deficiency payments in a closed economy 
Define the supply and demand functions as : 
[a.I.!]	 QS(P) = (p _pm)/a 
Qd(p) = (px - p)ht 
which are linear by assumption and where pm and pX are the intercepts of the inverse supply and 
demand curves with the vertical axes; and a and 7t are the absolute values of their slopes. Without 
government intervention in prices, producer surplus (= eA) and consumer surplus (= eB) are: 
[a.l.2] 
where pW is the equilibrium price without government intervention. Using the demand and supply 
equations, pWequals: 
[a. 1.3] pW = [(pm/a) + (px/7t)] / [(lIa) + (lI7t)] 
It follows that 
[a. 1.4]	 eA't = 0 QS(PW) (lI7t)/[(l/7t)+(l/a)] and 
eB't =0 QS(PW) (lIa)/[(l/7t)+(l/a)] 
where 0 = - dpm/dt reflects the productivity of the investment function. Hence, eA't > eB't if 
demand is more elastic than supply (a > 7t). 
The transfer t (which we define the net aggregate transfer to agriculture) is: 
[a. 1.5] 
with the deadweight costs c associated with t being: 
[a. 1.6] 
We can then analyze the impact of public investment 't on deadweight costs c associated with the • 
transfer t: 
[a. I.?]	 oc/8T. = [(Pt - pW)/a] [apt/8T. - apw/8T.] + [(pw - pC)/7t] [apw/8T. - apc/8T.] 
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To determine the sign of 8c/ETr., we use the fact that t remains constant: 
[a.l.8] 
We can derive that 
[a.l.9] apw/ETr. - apm/ETr. = 0 (lI1t) I [(lIa) + (l/1t)] > 0,
 
and, using [a.7] and [a.8], the first part of 8c/ETr. in equation [a.6] can be rewritten as :
 
[a.l.IO] [(pLpW)/a] [apt/ETr. - apw/ETr.] = - 0 (lIa) [(l/1t)/((l/a)+(l/1t»] [(pLpW)2 I (pL
 
pm)], 
which is negative for t > 0.10 
With pc = px - (1t/a)(pt - pm) and using [a.7] and [a.9], the second part of 8c/ETr. in equation 
[a.6] can be rewritten as : 
[a. l. 11] [(pw _pC)/1t] [apw/ETr. - apc/ETr.] = - 0 [(l/a)/((lIa)+(l/1t»] [(pLpW) I (pLpm)], 
which is negative for t > O. Hence we can conclude that, for t > 0, 8c/ETr. < 0, i.e. deadweight costs 
for a given level of transfer decrease with an increase in public research investment. Furthermore, 
it turns out that c'tt = 8c't/at < 0.11 
A. 2 Import tariff in a small open economy 
The deadweight costs c associated with transfer t with an import tariff are:
 
t 2 t w2
[a.2.1] c(t) = (pt - pW)2 12a + (p - pW) 121t = [(lIa) + (l/P)](P - p ) 12. 
[a.2.2] 8clat = [(lIa) + (lJr3)].(pt_pw). aptlat 
With apt/at = a/(pt - pm) > 0 , it follows that 8clat > 0 for an import tariff (t > 0) and 8clat < 0 
when t < 0 (e.g. in the case ofan export tax). Further, we can derive that 
-

[a.2.3] 
10 Notice that this sign can be directly obtained from condition [14]. Derme P = (pw _ pm)/(pt _ pm), 
which implies that P < 1 if agriculture is subsidized, Le. if t > 0 (and assuming that pW > pm and pt > 
pID). Combining condition [14] and P < 1 implies that fJpt/Ot - fJpm/Ot < fJpw lOt - fJpm/Ot and that the 
ftrst part of aclOt in equation [13] is negative. 
11 To show: Ctt = act/at < 0 (proof is available upon request). 
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Therefore, this example is consistent with the assumptions of our model. 
The impact of public investment 't on deadweight costs c associated with transfer policy t, for 
a given level of t, is: 
[a.2.4] Bc/8t = [(lIa) + (lI~)] (pt - pW ) apt/8t
 
To determine the sign of 8c/8t we use the fact that t remains constant (ceteris paribus), i.e.
 
[a.2.5] BtJ8t = [CPt - pm)/a] [apt/8t - apm/8t] - [(pw - pm)/a] [apw/8t - apm/8t] = 0, 
which implies that 
t t w t m[a.2.6] ap 18t = -()[(P - p )/(P - p )] 
where () = - dpm/d't reflects the productivity of the investment function. It follows apt/8t >,=,< 0 
for t <,=,> 0, assuming that prices never fully prohibit domestic production (i.e. pt > pm always). 
Combining [a.2.4] and [a.2.6] yields that 8c/8t < 0 for both t > 0 and t < 0, i.e. deadweight 
costs for a given level of transfer decrease with an increase in public investment. If tariffs are 
zero, obviously there is no effect of't on deadweight costs (Bc/8t = 0 for t = 0). 
We also calculate C'tt= a2c/8tat. Using [a.2.6] we first derive that 
[a.2.7] 
With apt/at> 0 and 0 > 0 this implies that a2pt/8tat > O. We use this to derive that 
[a.2.8] 
In conclusion, C't < 0 and C'tt < 0 always (unless t = 0), while Ct> 0 for t > 0 and Ct < 0 for t < 0 
A.3 Fixed price support cum (variable) export subsidies in a large open economy 
Define foreign excess demand Qed(p) = (pz - p)ly, where pZ is the intercept with the vertical 
axis ap.d y the absolute value of the slope of the excess demand curve. The free market 
equilibrium price pw is determined as 
[a.3.l] pW = [(pm/a ) + (px/7t) + (pzly)] I n 
-

where n = [(l/a) + (l/7t) + (lly)]. It follows that 
[a.3.2] eA't = () QS(PW) [(l/7t)+(lIy)]/n and 
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This implies that producers gain less than consumers from an increase in public investment (eA't > 
eB't) if Qd(pW)/Qs(pW) > [(lI7t) + (l/y)]/(lIa). This is more likely to occur when the self­
sufficiency ratio is greater, when domestic and foreign demand are less elastic (i.e. smaller 7t and 
y) and when supply is more elastic (larger a). These conditions are characteristics of agriculture 
in developed countries, such as the ED and North America. 
Consider now the case when the government imposes a minimum guaranteed price pt 
sustained by a variable export subsidy or import tariff, which is the difference between pt and the 
effective world market price pc. Transfer tis: 
[a.3.3] 
Total deadweight costs c associated with tare: 
[a.3.4] 
where the first term represents subsidies to foreign consumers. The second and third term 
represent domestic consumption and production distortions. 
The impact ofpublic investment 't on c of transfer policy t, for a given level oft is: 
[a.3.5]	 Bc/ETt = [(pw_pC)8Qx/ETt + QX(Bpw/ETt_Bpc/ETt)] + [(lIa)+(l/7t)] [(PCpW)(Bpt/ETt-B 
pw/ETt)] 
Analogous to the target price and deficiency payments case we can show that the second part of 
[a.3.5] is negative, given the result that 
[a.3.6] Bpw/ETt - Bpffi/ETt = 8 [(l/7t)+(l/y)]/O > 0,
 
under the open economy situation. To determine the sign of first part of[a.3.5], first rewrite
 
[a.3.7] Bpw/ETt-Bpc/ETt = (8y/0) [(l/a)+(lI7t)][(lI7t)+(l/y)] (P-I) 
which is negative for t>0 (P<l); and 
[a.3.8J 8QX/ETt = (8/0) {[(l/a)+(lI7t)][(l/7t)+(l/y)] (P-I) + (lIa)(l/y)} 
The first part of [a.3.8] is negative for t>0 (P<l), but the second part is always positive. Therefore, 
the sign of 8Qx/ETt cannot be determined unambiguously. It is more likely to be negative if ­
protection is higher (P lower) and if domestic demand is more elastic (7t smaller). If supply and 
foreign demand are more elastic (a and y smaller) the last (positive) term increases, but also the 
first term. 
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Combining these results shows that all terms in [a.3.5] are negative except for the last term 
of [25], which we just discussed. Combining all terms yields the following: 
[a.3.9]	 8c/8T. = (6/0) { [Qx(Pt) - QX(PW)] [(l/a)+(lI1t)+y] [(lIa)+(lI1t)][(1/1t)+(lIy)] 
(P-l)+ Qx(Pt) y [(lIa)+(lI1t)][(lI1t)+(l/y)] (P-l) + [Qx(Pi) - QX(PW)] (lIa) } 
in which all terms are negative for t>0 (p<l), except for the last term [Qx(Pt) - QX(PW)] (lIa). 
The aggregate effect 8c/8T. is more likely to be negative if protection is higher (P lower) and if 
domestic demand is more elastic (1t smaller). If supply is more elastic (a smaller) the last 
(positive) term increases, but also the first terms. Recall that we are analysing the situation under 
which ~A < ~B, which is more likely when demand is more elastic (1t smaller) and supply is less 
elastic (a larger). Under these conditions, 8c/8T. is likely negative. 
-

Table 1: Impact of Research on Deadweight Costs of Commodity Policy 
dc/d-r 
Commodity Policy 
Output quota 
Target price & 
deficiency payments 
Output subsidy 
Import tariff 
Fixed price support & 
variable export subsidy 
Trade Status Commodity Policy 
Instrument fIxed 
Net Income Transfer 
fIXed 
no trade 
no trade 
+ 
+ 
no trade 
small country 
o 
o 
small country 
small country 
large county 
o 
o 
+ ? 
-
- - -
- -
I 
Table 2: Summary of Results for Alternative Government Objective Functions 
Government 
Objective Function 
Max. Income s.t. farm 
income constraint 
/ 
Max. Weighted Pref. Fn 
ac/8t 
&t*/8t 
dc/d't 
Bc/8t 
&t*/8t 
dc/d't 
Max. Political Support Bc/8t 
&t*/8t 
dc/d't 
Small 
Target price with deficiency Country 
payments 
Import 
No trade Tariff 
--
--
- -
~ ~ 
- - -
+ - + 
+ - ? 
~ ~ 
I I+1 
I I 
- ? ­
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